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Abstract 
Decisions concerning environmental protection hinge on estimates of economic burden. Over the 
past 30 years, economists have developed and applied various tools to measure this burden. In this paper, 
developed as a chapter for the Handbook of Environmental Economics, we present a taxonomy of costs 
along with methods for measuring those costs. At the broadest level, we distinguish between partial and 
general equilibrium costs. Partial equilibrium costs represent the burden directly borne by the regulated 
entity (firms, households, government), including both pecuniary and nonpecuniary expenses, when 
prices are held constant. General equilibrium costs reflect the net burden once all good and factor markets 
have equilibrated. In addition to partial equlibrium costs, these general equilibrium costs include welfare 
losses or gains in markets with preexisting distortions, welfare losses or gains from rebalancing the 
government’s budget constraint, and welfare gains from the added flexibilty of meeting pollution 
constraints through reductions in the use of higher-priced, pollution-intensive products. In addition to 
both partial and general equilibrium costs, we also consider the distribution of costs across households, 
countries, sectors, subnational regions, and generations. Despite improvements in our understanding of 
cost measurement, we find considerable opportunity for further work and, especially, better application of 
existing methods. 
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 Calculating the Cost of Environmental Regulation 
William A. Pizer and Raymond Kopp∗ 
1. Introduction 
The real and perceived economic costs associated with environmental protection are 
easily the greatest obstacles to cleaner air and water, improved preservation of ecosystems and 
biodiversity, and slower depletion of natural resources. Over the past 30 years, considerable 
effort has been directed at quantifying these costs and improving measurement methods. 
Aggregate estimates for the United States suggest that roughly 2% of gross domestic product 
(GDP) is spent on environmental protection.1 Data for other countries are less comprehensive but 
suggest similar levels of expense.2 More important than these aggregate cost estimates—which 
imply a decision whether to protect the environment or not—are increasingly frequent and 
detailed studies of the cost of specific initiatives.3 
Despite such efforts, the accurate measurement of costs remains challenging. This is true 
conceptually—in terms of defining what we include as costs—and especially in practice, where 
studies use very different methodological approaches to estimate these costs. 
Our goal is to create a taxonomy of the different methods and theories of cost 
measurement, to show how they relate to one another, and to explain how various empirical 
exercises fit in. Imagine, for a moment, that a policymaker, analyst, or citizen asks what we must 
give up in order to protect an endangered species, remedy a polluted area, or prevent future 
                                                 
∗ The authors are Fellow and Senior Fellow, respectively, at Resources for the Future. Michael Batz provided 
excellent research assistance. This paper was prepared as Chapter 20 of the Handbook of Environmental Economics, 
edited by Karl-Göran Mäler and Jeffrey Vincent. We are grateful to Peter Berck, Lars Bergman, and Larry Goulder 
for extremely valuable comments on an earlier draft. Naturally, any remaining errors or omissions should be 
attributed to the authors.  
1 See U.S. EPA (1990a) and Rutledge and Vogan (1994) 
2 See Table 13.1 in OECD (1999) and more recent estimates available on the OECD web-site http://www.oecd.org/ 
(“Selected Environmental Data”). The OECD data suggest that expenditures range from 0.6% to 2.0% of GDP 
among OECD countries. 
3 For example, see analysis by both EPA and the Energy Information Administration presented during hearings 
before the U.S. Senate (Consideration of S. 556, Clean Power Act 2001). Alternatively, see a recent survey of cost 
analyses by Harrington et al. (2000). Resources for the Future  Pizer and Kopp  
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climate change. The answer first depends on the consequences we ascribe to an environmental 
action—direct compliance costs, forgone opportunities, lost flexibility, etc. The answer also 
depends on whether the policy will meaningfully influence the price of goods and services, in 
which case it will be necessary to consider the possible welfare consequences due to preexisting 
distortions in other (primarily factor) markets, government behavior, and changes in the terms of 
trade. Finally, the answer depends on whether concern exists about the “we” taken as a whole, or 
about all the pieces “we” comprise. Our chapter focuses on each of these questions in turn: 
partial equilibrium costs, general equilibrium effects and broad economic costs, and the 
distribution of burden. 
The object of our analysis will be one or more relationships of the form 
  ( ) costs , i C = az, (1) 
where a is a parameter or vector of parameters describing an environmental policy, z is a vector 
of parameters summarizing the current economic equilibrium, and  ( ) , i C az is the associated cost 
borne by agent i. The vector z should be viewed as the economic features agent i is likely to 
assume are fixed in doing a cost calculation—features such as input prices and output level for a 
business, or prices and income for a consumer.4 Once computed, this cost  () , i C az might then be 
compared with the cost of an alternative policy,  ( ) , i C ′ az, compared with the cost of no policy, 
() 0, i C z , compared with the cost  ( ) , j C az  borne by another agent j, compared with an estimate 
of benefits, or used to compute a marginal cost  ( ) , i C ∂ ∂ az a  and then compared with marginal 
benefits.  
In each of these cases, we can distinguish between partial and general equilibrium costs, 
and among costs borne by various agents, by considering both the endogeneity of the vector z 
and the enumeration of agents i. When z is held fixed and i is limited to the directly regulated 
agent(s), we ignore price and activity changes in other markets and measure only the direct 
compliance costs in a partial equilibrium. By instead considering the relationship z(a), we can 
evaluate costs when policy effects are transmitted to other markets and the economy equilibrates. 
By summing costs across agents that compose final demand, we arrive at a measure of the total 
                                                 
4 We are necessarily vague about z at this point because the environmental policy necessarily disrupts the economic 
equilibrium. Holding z fixed, as described below, is meant to capture the notion of a partial equilibrium evaluation. Resources for the Future  Pizer and Kopp  
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cost to the economy.5 This is the notion of cost most often described by economists (e.g., 
Harberger 1971; Diamond and Mirrlees 1971).  
Defining and estimating  () , i C az is far from trivial. It may be difficult for agents to 
appreciate fully the costs associated with a, such as the opportunity cost of borrowing employees 
from other tasks to focus on pollution control, or of building space for house abatement 
equipment. It also requires sophisticated and complete models of the economy to elucidate the 
relation z(a) as well as transmission of costs to agents not directly affected by environmental 
policy (owners of capital, product consumers, factor suppliers).6 Addressing these questions, we 
have divided our discussion into three parts. In the next section we consider the various 
consequences of environmental protection for those who are directly regulated. This analysis 
typically holds the behavior in the remainder of the economy fixed and is therefore considered 
partial equilibrium analysis. In Section 3, we consider broad economic costs, taking into account 
the general equilibrium effects outside the market where environmental protection occurs and 
focusing on final demand. In Section 4, we consider in more detail the question of who bears the 
cost. 
2.  Environmental Protection Costs and Consequences: Partial Equilibrium 
Popular debate over environmental protection often centers on the out-of-pocket 
expenditures or other negative consequences7 directly associated with pollution reduction paid 
by firms, governments, and households. In this section we examine various ways these costs are 
defined and estimated in the economic literature, organizing the discussion around the affected 
agent and type of cost, and later returning to the common issues of uncertainty and discounting. 
For the moment, we ignore how good and factor prices are likely to adjust, both creating new 
welfare effects in other markets and shifting the burden to different agents—that is, we are 
                                                 
5 Here we emphasize that total costs involve only components of final demand because costs to businesses are 
passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices or reduced factor (capital-labor) income. In an open economy, 
this will involve costs potentially borne by the foreign sector (McKibbin et al. 1999). 
6 For example, U.S. EPA analysis of recently proposed power plant regulation estimated costs of $3.1 billion to $6.9 
billion without completely describing who bears these costs: power plant owners, factor suppliers (e.g., coal 
companies), or particular end-users (2001). 
7 Such consequences, including effects on jobs (Hahn and Steger 1990; Rosewicz 1990) or international 
competitiveness (Jaffe et al. 1995), can be converted to pecuniary effects. Other, more indirect costs are discussed 
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implicitly following a partial equilibrium approach and ignoring actual incidence. We return to 
these important issues in Sections 3 and 4, respectively. 
The overwhelming focal point of the literature to date has been measurement of the direct 
compliance cost to firms. Given sufficient knowledge of production technologies, obtained 
through engineering studies or revealed market behavior, the cost of environmental protection 
described by (1) is a relatively straightforward calculation for firms. Studies of government 
compliance costs, while rarer in the literature, are similarly straightforward thanks to detailed 
budget documentation. Analyses of regulatory impacts on households are rarer still—and fraught 
with difficulty. It is hard to identify, let alone measure, the “technology” for pollution control 
activities and the immediate cost to households of environmental regulations.  
2.1. Direct Compliance Costs 
Environmental policies applied to firms either directly force changes in production 
methods (command-and-control policies) or provide incentives to do so by changing prices 
(market-based policies). The direct compliance cost is the change in production costs entailed by 
the policy. This cost will depend on the particular technological alternatives available to the firm. 
Techniques for modeling and estimating production technology are well described in the 
economic literature (Caves and Christensen 1980; Färe 1988; Jorgenson 1986). Engineering 
models of pollution and abatement also exist (e.g., U.S. EPA 1990, 1985). Finally, surveys of 
business and governments can be used to provide direct estimates of pollution control costs 
(McGraw-Hill various years; Bureau of the Census 1973-1997; OECD 1999). All of these 
methods have been heavily used—and criticized—in the analysis of environmental protection 
costs. 
A convenient way to understand the roles of these various costing techniques is to 
consider the channels through which pollution can be reduced and the data necessary to quantify 
relevant abatement costs. In some cases, pollution is associated with a particular input, and 
substitution away from that input will reduce pollution. In other cases, pollution reduction arises 
from changing the production process or installing “end-of-pipe” equipment to capture pollutants 
before they escape.8 When input substitution is the primary mechanism for reducing emissions, 
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or when process changes or end-of-pipe treatment has already occurred and the study is 
retrospective, historical data can be used to estimate relationships between observed or estimated 
emissions and production costs. However, absent relevant historical experience with pollution 
control or input substitution, econometrically estimable production models are unlikely to 
provide useful information about abatement costs. 
In the case of prospective cost analysis where input substitution is not the primary means 
of pollution control, often the only way to estimate costs is to pose the question to engineers 
familiar with abatement technology. Early studies of specific environmental regulation followed 
this approach. These efforts, including Atkinson and Lewis (1974), Seskin, et al. (1983), Perl and 
Dunbar (1982), and Krupnick (1986), estimate the cost of alternative policies based on linear 
programming models of firm response using specific technology options enumerated by 
engineering experts. This approach is also used by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) in its regulatory impact analyses of proposed regulations (e.g., U.S. EPA 1985, 1992). 
Through 1979, the president’s Council on Environmental Quality used engineering estimates to 
forecast aggregate pollution control costs in the annual publication Environmental Quality. 
Discussions of these types of analyses can be found in Tietenberg (1992) and more recently in 
Morgenstern (1997). 
Although an engineering approach is most useful when tailored to the specific 
characteristics of an individual plant, it can be problematic when applied on a broad scale. This 
often involves estimates based on a “typical” plant that are then extrapolated to the entire 
industry. Technologies differ across plants, as do factor costs and even local (state and 
municipal) environmental regulations (CBO 1985). For this reason there has been some concern 
about the accuracy of this approach when applied to broad regulatory initiatives. 
More recently, there has been a large volume of work on the cost of reducing carbon 
dioxide emissions to mitigate the threat of climate change. Like the early analyses of abatement 
in the 1970s and 1980s, this work is prospective. Unlike these analyses, however, abatement is 
linked directly to reduced use of specific polluting inputs: fossil fuels, including coal, oil, and 
natural gas. This has allowed researchers to make use of historical information about fuel 
substitution to estimate the cost of emissions reductions, rather than rely on engineering Resources for the Future  Pizer and Kopp  
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estimates. Surveys of these efforts include Nordhaus (1991), Gaskins and Weyant (1993), and 
Weyant (1999).9 
Alternatives to prospective cost studies have arisen with the collection of increasing 
amounts of data on observed or reported expenditures on environmental protection. Most 
notably, in 1973, the Bureau of the Census (1973-1997) began collecting and publishing data on 
Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures (PACE) based on surveys of individual 
manufacturing plants. The data provide aggregate industry-level estimates of the out-of-pocket 
expenses associated with environmental protection in the manufacturing sector. Although the 
survey approach is widely used, Portney (1981) points out the potential problems with it: sample 
size, response rate, and the difficulty among respondents with accurately distinguishing pollution 
control expenditures. Streitwieser (1995) similarly reports that question misinterpretation has 
been identified as the most serious deficiency of the PACE survey. 
As these surveys have been refined and become more widely accepted, they have been 
combined with similar estimates from other sectors of the economy to estimate economy-wide 
costs, as shown in Table 1 (see also U.S. EPA 1984, 1990, 1999; Vogan 1996). These estimates 
represent the out-of-pocket expenses attributed to different agents in the economy, shown as 
consumers, business, and government. As noted by Schmalensee (1994), simply tallying these 
estimates to estimate total costs ignores many indirect costs and may double-count expenses that 
are not part of final demand. We return to this issue in Section 3. 
When both prospective engineering estimates and retrospective reported expenditures are 
available for a particular regulation, a comparison between the two is possible. Harrington et al. 
(2000) do this and observe an interesting pattern of results. Among 18 regulations for which they 
were able to establish both prospective and retrospective cost measures, the prospective 
estimates were higher in two of three cases. They point out, however, that this frequently occurs 
because the amount of pollution control was lower than initially estimated, thereby reducing 
costs.  
Returning to our focus on the functional relationship between environmental protection 
and cost,  () , i C az, both engineering and survey approaches are problematic in their inability to 
                                                 
9 These surveys describe aggregate modeling exercises that incorporate elements of the next section on social costs. 
However, the exercises are based on production and consumer models that reflect private carbon-abatement costs 
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capture uncounted costs or coincidental benefits—uncounted by either the engineer or the survey 
respondent.10 Economists have proposed many reasons why these uncounted costs might be 
significant, as well as methods for revealing them. We now turn to these issues. 
2.2. Indirect Costs and Revealed Cost Measures 
Soon after the appearance of survey-based estimates of compliance costs in the literature, 
economists began postulating the existence of additional, uncounted burdens associated with 
environmental protection. For example, regulations that required large capital expenditures could 
arguably crowd other productive investments (Rose 1983). Or regulations that imposed tighter 
limits on new emissions sources could discourage investment in otherwise newer and more 
productive equipment (Gruenspecht 1982; Nelson et al. 1993). Finally, there is the general 
concern that environmental regulation reduces operating flexibility, slowing productivity 
improvements in general (Joshi et al. 1997; Boyd et al. 1998). 
For example, many of these concerns about indirect or “hidden” costs have been applied 
to the New Source Review (NSR) program in the United States (U.S. EPA 2002). Under this 
program, new or substantially modified facilities must meet stringent emissions standards. By 
exempting old facilities, older plants become relatively more profitable, and firms tend to operate 
them longer rather than investing in new plants. Because of the murky definition of “substantial 
modification,” firms may also underinvest in maintaining older plants for fear of triggering NSR. 
It is exactly these kinds of undesirable incentives and potentially large indirect costs that have 
encouraged greater reliance on market mechanisms in the United States and abroad (Gruenspecht 
and Stavins 2002).11 
Distinct from these costs associated with unintended or distorted behavior, Schmalensee 
(1994) raises several additional concerns about measurement problems that plague survey 
estimates: No attempt is made to measure legal fees or paperwork costs. Nor can we easily 
capture the cost of operating restrictions, such as the increased logging costs associated with 
                                                 
10 This is less of an issue in approaches based on measures of input substitution, such as carbon abatement costs 
from reduced fossil fuel use. 
11 For example, the acid rain trading program in the United States and the Kyoto Protocol developed under the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Resources for the Future  Pizer and Kopp  
  8
spotted owl protection.12 Finally, the potential to redesign entire production lines to prevent 
pollution while also improving efficiency makes it difficult to identify specific expenditures 
related to environmental protection. This is particular true as efforts turn increasingly to pollution 
prevention (Tietenberg 1998). It is unclear whether plant managers can realistically discern the 
pollution prevention component of expenditures on process changes and cleaner technologies 
embodied in new capital (Morgenstern et al. 1999). Instructions for the reinstituted 1999 PACE 
survey ask respondents to include “expenditures where environmental protection was the 
primary purpose,” later adding that this should measure the incremental costs by comparing 
actual expenditures with that for “the alternative technology that would have been adopted were 
environmental protection not a consideration.”13 
In light of that difficulty, many empirical papers have sought revealed rather than stated 
measures of cost at the plant level. In an early example of this approach, Gollup and Roberts 
(1983) estimate the cost of lower sulfur dioxide emissions on electric power utilities. They use a 
cross-section of plant-level utility data to relate sulfur emissions to total generating costs. More 
recently, Coggins and Swinton (1996) examine the marginal cost of sulfur control among a 
smaller set of power plants in Wisconsin. Similarly, Pittman (1981) calculates the cost of 
controlling water pollution using a sample of pulp and paper mills in Wisconsin and Michigan. 
Using the same data, Färe et al. (1993) estimate plant-specific costs from the data. McClelland 
and Horowitz (1999) also examine water pollution control costs at pulp and paper mills, but they 
include information on the permitted versus actual emissions levels. Finally, Hartman et al. 
(1997) conduct a broad study of abatement costs in the manufacturing sector based on early 
PACE data that also includes abatement information. 
All of those studies make use of environmental indicators to establish cost units. More 
often than not, however, data on actual emissions, abatement, or other environmental indicators 
are unavailable. This has led to a simpler effort to compare reported environmental expenditures 
with total production expenditures. Anything more than a one-to-one relationship would indicate 
indirect costs that remain uncounted in the reported environmental expenditures. Gray (1987) 
                                                 
12 Spotted owl protection restricts the harvest of old-growth timber from federally owned lands in the Pacific 
Northwest. The magnitude and incidence of policy effects on such a regional timber supply restriction depend on 
market features distinct from production technology (Murray and Wear 1998). Schmalensee’s (1994) point is that a 
lumber firm is unlikely to go to the trouble to estimate such costs in response to a Census Bureau questionnaire. 
13 From the general definition of pollution abatement activities and the additional definition for pollution prevention 
capital expenditures, 1999 Survey of Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures (Bureau of the Census 2000). Resources for the Future  Pizer and Kopp  
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and Barbera and McConnell (1990) first studied this question using aggregate data, while 
subsequent work by Gray and Shadbegian (1994); Joshi et al. (1997); and Morgenstern et al. 
(1999) used detailed plant-level data. Although Gray and Shadbegian (1994) and Joshi et al. 
found evidence of uncounted costs, Gray (1987) and Morgenstern et al. did not. Barbera and 
McConnell are ambiguous.  
The analyses relating measured environmental performance to overall production costs at 
the plant level provide the most convincing data concerning the expenditures associated with 
specific environmental benefits. They provide a revealed rather than reported measure of 
environmental amenity costs. In this way, they avoid the potential pitfalls of both uncounted 
categories and misallocated expenses associated with both engineering and survey estimates used 
to quantify the relation in (1). In the absence of environmental performance measures, the second 
group of papers offers insight into whether survey-based cost estimates should be trusted. 
Though not unanimous, many of those studies support the accuracy of survey measures. Survey 
accuracy is particularly relevant for estimates of national environmental expenditures, which 
abstract from environmental performance and lean almost exclusively on survey measures. 
2.3. Negative Costs? 
Although considerable work has explored the potential for indirect costs at the firm level, 
there has been limited work on the potential for indirect benefits to firms—that is, negative costs. 
Porter and van der Linde (1995a, 1995b argue that firms are not always operating efficiently and 
that environmental regulation can lead firms to recognize and correct these inefficiencies. This 
can lead to a significant indirect firm benefit in terms of increased productivity. DeCanio (1993) 
and Lovins (1996) present similar arguments. Based on engineering and econometric studies, 
they argue that significant inefficiencies—particularly in energy usage—exist throughout the 
economy. 
Despite the obvious appeal of costless or even profitable environmental improvements, 
most economists remain skeptical. Palmer et al.  (1995) respond that despite the presence of 
some cost-saving offsets, environmental regulation generally must increase costs and lower 
profit. They point to both surveys of plant managers and conversations with company officials 
indicating that the realized cost savings are small compared with the cost of environmental 
protection itself. While conceding that substantial savings might occur in a few cases, they 
conclude that the bulk of the empirical evidence supports nonzero costs. Resources for the Future  Pizer and Kopp  
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The aforementioned work by Gray and Shadbegian (1994), Joshi et al. (1997), and 
Morgenstern et al. (1999) provides further evidence against this hypothesis. Although these 
authors were searching for uncounted costs, their methodology had the capacity to identify 
uncounted cost savings, or negative costs, as well. Morgenstern found evidence of significant 
cost saving in one of four industries (pulp and paper) relative to reported expenditures, but it was 
not sufficient to result in negative compliance costs overall. 
2.4.  Government Expenditures on Environmental Protection 
Costs borne by private agents, such as businesses or consumers, must be determined by 
observation or questionnaires. In contrast, costs borne by governments (federal, state, and local) 
are part of the public record. For that reason, much less effort has focused on trying to measure 
these costs—they are simply compiled from appropriate government reports (e.g., U.S. Bureau 
of the Census 1997). National cost estimates conducted by various government agencies have 
differed in their treatment of specific programmatic areas of government expense, such as 
Superfund, solid waste disposal, drinking water, and other state and local mandates, as well as 
their allocation of capital expense across time (Jaffe et al. 1995; Schmalensee 1994). Despite 
these differences, the underlying data are generally considered an accurate measure of 
programmatic expense. 
In addition to direct expenditures on pollution control and environmental protection, the 
government also spends resources on enforcement and monitoring. These costs, which are also 
measurable based on government budget information, are typically small (roughly 2%; see Table 
1) compared with national expenditures on environmental protection (Vogan 1996). 
2.5. Household Regulation 
Regulations that effectively take income away from consumers result in direct costs to 
households.14 Although the majority of out-of-pocket costs summarized in Table 1 accrue to 
businesses and government, some are borne directly by households. Those noted in the table 
refer to expenditures on emissions control devices for motor vehicles. Interestingly, this estimate 
associated with emissions controls ignores the annual cost of queuing for auto emissions 
                                                 
14 Here, we ignore the potential increase in consumer prices associated with environmental regulation of firms—this 
is a general equilibrium and/or incidence issue that we return to in the next sections. Resources for the Future  Pizer and Kopp  
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inspections. More generally, the cost associated with environmental programs (e.g., recycling) in 
terms of household time is ignored.15 Embed these types of programs in models of household 
production (Morris and Holthausen 1994) and one sees how the efficiency of household 
production is diminished, resulting in loss of household utility.  
Regulation can affect households in other ways. In the case of pesticide regulation, 
products that pose significant environmental and health threats can be banned. In such cases 
households may switch to higher-cost or lower-quality substitutes. A change in product “quality” 
reduces household utility and represents a real cost, but it is very difficult to quantify. 
A third category of cost results from regulation that restricts household behavior. 
Although such regulation represents a small category at present, behavior-restricting regulations, 
particularly recreational restrictions to advance ecosystem goals, may grow in the future. For 
example, regulations that ban particular types of sport fishing, exclude motorized vehicles from 
sensitive habitats, or restrict all human intrusion into special areas cause the value of those 
recreational experiences to decline for those who otherwise would engage in them. 
The last category of household costs we mention has to do with land use. Development 
restrictions on a piece of real estate cause the property value to decline and cause the property 
owner to suffer a capital loss. The restrictions might be imposed to protect an ecosystem, 
preserve environmental amenities (beaches, for example), or limit suburban sprawl. Increased 
concern over each of these issues suggests that land use restrictions will be an important 
regulatory tool for some time to come. 
2.6. Uncertainty 
Few analyses of environmental protection costs consider uncertainty in their analyses. 
Some perform a sensitivity analysis over key assumptions (e.g., Chapter 7 of U.S. EPA 1999). 
However, a sensitivity analysis merely shows how estimates change with alternative 
assumptions; it does not indicate what value to use for a benefit comparison or how decisions 
should be made. 
Considerable work in statistical decision theory dating back to at least Wald (1950) and 
more recently Berger (1985) describes a straightforward, though computationally demanding, 
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approach to decisionmaking under uncertainty. By assigning probabilities to different outcomes, 
it is possible to compute expected costs. More generally, a policymaker willing to specify 
preferences over both uncertain costs and benefits—including risk aversion—can identify 
policies preferred in expectation.16 Kolstad (1982) and Pizer (1999) provide environmental 
examples of this approach. A related issue, when both benefits and costs are considered jointly, 
is whether price policies are preferable to quantity policies. Price policies tend to lower both 
expected costs and expected benefits relative to quantity policies. Weitzman (1974) derives 
conditions where one instrument is preferred. 
Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Pindyck (1995) point out another issue partly but not 
wholly related to uncertainty: the irreversibility associated with some environmental policies. 
The potential exists for environmental protection activities to involve irreversible costs as well as 
for environmental consequences to involve irreversible damage. In the former case, the cost of a 
policy is raised by the forgone option value associated with waiting to see whether the 
environmental protection is necessary. In the latter case, the cost of a policy is lowered by the 
value of the option to prevent possibly irreversible damage. This option value could depend 
wholly on the passage of time but most often involves learning about uncertain outcomes. 
Computing the option value is further complicated when the choice of policy influences the 
learning process (Kelly 1999; Nordhaus 1997). 
2.7. Discounting 
Most cost analyses focus on current or annualized expenditures, as shown in Table 1. 
This facilitates a straightforward comparison with annualized benefits resulting from improved 
environmental quality. The emergence of global climate change as a major environmental policy 
issue forces us to rethink that approach. In particular, it forces us to consider comparisons of 
costs and benefits across very long periods of time, since climate change mitigation expenditures 
today yield benefits far in the future. 
To compare costs (and benefits) over time, costs in the future are discounted to the 
present at a particular rate. The appropriate rate of discount has been subject to much debate 
(Lind 1982; Arrow et al. 1996; Bazerlon and Smetters 1999), with different rates leading to 
                                                 
16 The notion of risk aversion captures the idea that we are not indifferent between a risky $10 gain and a certain 
$10 gain. In statistical decision theory, this amounts to defining a loss function; in utility theory, it reflects a choice 
of utility or welfare function. Resources for the Future  Pizer and Kopp  
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dramatically different estimates of benefits and costs (Cline 1992). In the case of climate change, 
rates near zero support aggressive policy responses, with costs appearing small relative to 
benefits; rates exceeding 5% suggest modest policy responses, with costs appearing large relative 
to benefits. These observations have led to recent work on the consequences of uncertainty about 
the discount rate itself (Weitzman 2001; Newell and Pizer 2003). Even ignoring the question of 
the appropriate rate, some qualitative results remain. When the focus of climate change 
mitigation policy is a long-term concentration target, rather than a particular emissions profile, 
Wigley et al. (1996) demonstrate that discounting as well as adjustment costs favor some delay 
in mitigation relative to an immediate reversal in emissions growth. 
In dynamic equilibrium models, much of the concern about discounting is embedded in 
the model specification via consumer preferences over time. As we will see in the next section, 
such models allow one to summarize the total cost associated with environmental controls across 
many periods, just as Table 1 summarizes the costs associated with environmental controls 
across different agents. 
3.  General Equilibrium Effects 
The concepts described so far have focused on the costs associated with regulatory 
compliance by various economic actors—firms, governments, or households. Such analysis 
ignores the indirect impact that environmental protection activities in one market can have on 
activities in other markets, as well as feedback in the original market, as the economy 
equilibrates to these additional burdens. We are most often interested in the total cost including 
these indirect effects on welfare—effects that can sometimes be quite large relative to the more 
obvious consequences measured by the regulated entities. Stated another way, the question to ask 
about a proposed regulation or policy is the overall burden to the national economy, not just the 
sum of the direct costs measured in isolation.  
Welfare effects in other markets arise because of preexisting distortions in those markets 
from current taxes or regulation. Such distortions—a difference between the point where the 
market would like to equilibrate, matching supply and demand at one price, and where the 
market does equilibrate in the presence of taxes or regulation—create deadweight loss. This 
deadweight loss is a cost that reduces the production possibilities of the entire economy. For 
example, taxes on labor income discourage people from working as much as they would if they 
received the full value of their time. When an environmental regulation is introduced, it can Resources for the Future  Pizer and Kopp  
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affect the existing deadweight loss in these already-distorted markets by shifting supply or 
demand and changing the magnitude of the deadweight loss in that market. 
Consideration of equilibrium price changes can affect the original cost estimates for the 
directly regulated entities as well as welfare in other markets. For example, the cost of an 
electricity policy that encourages fuel substitution from coal to natural gas will rise if increased 
natural gas demand raises the price of natural gas versus a case where additional natural gas is 
available at the same price. On the other hand, the cost of the policy will fall if consumers 
demand less electricity as the price of electricity rises in response to the policy, versus a case 
where electricity demand remains constant. To the extent that distortions do not exist elsewhere 
in the economy, however, total costs can still be measured in the regulated sector even as the 
economy equilibrates.17 
As we try to measure these total costs, this overall burden, we increasingly focus on the 
real decline in final demand—consumption, investment, and government spending—to avoid 
double counting (Schäfer and Stahmer 1989; Schmalensee 1994). Environmental regulations that 
raise the price of energy, for example, raise both the cost of energy and the cost of manufactured 
goods that are energy-intensive. If we count both the increase in manufacturing costs and the 
increase in consumer expenditures on higher-priced manufactured goods, we double-count the 
cost of the regulation. This has led to a focus on the consequences for real GDP in many 
analyses. Such a focus, however, fails to account for the consumption of leisure (and other 
nonmarket transactions) and ignores the distinction between investment in pollution control 
equipment and investment in productive capital. This means that typical analyses focused on 
“GDP effects” can be misleading, as highlighted below.18 
Once the economy equilibrates, the change in final demand will include both the original 
costs discussed in the previous section (and passed on to households as either higher prices or 
                                                 
17 That is, the marginal cost of incremental regulation in the regulated sector equals the marginal welfare cost of the 
incremental regulation measured across the entire economy. This is a consequence of the First Fundamental Welfare 
Theorem—a competitive market equilibrium is welfare maximizing and therefore the market value of the 
incremental regulation can be viewed as a shadow price. See, for example, Chapter 16 of Mas-Colell et al. (1995). 
18 Weyant and Hill (1999), for example, focus on GDP losses in analyzing global climate change policies. A later 
article in the same special issue (McKibbin et al. 1999) shows an example (Table 4) where GDP falls and 
consumption rises in 2020. Although GDP and consumption will generally move in the same direction, the 
quantitative differences raise interesting questions about how quantitative results should be presented—in terms of 
the more familiar (and popular) GDP measure or the more economically relevant consumption measure. Resources for the Future  Pizer and Kopp  
  15
lower factor income), as well as indirect effects occurring in other markets. Consumer 
preferences provide a natural metric for valuing these changes in final demand. Consumers, in 
the guise of both purchasers of goods and owners of productive inputs (as well as the 
beneficiaries of investment returns and government provision of public goods), are the implicit if 
not explicit focus of most cost analyses.19 A change in their well-being can be monetized by 
computing the equivalent variation in consumer income. Equivalent variation measures the 
change in income that would lead to the same change in a consumer’s well-being as the policy 
under scrutiny.20 
3.1. An Example 
At this point, it is useful to consider an example to illustrate the different ways in which a 
partial equilibrium analysis—as well as GDP measures—can fail to correctly capture aggregate 
costs. We imagine a simple economy where a single consumer works for the economy’s sole 
employer, a power plant that produces energy (x). The plant uses a linear technology to produce 
x0 units of energy with  00 p x ⋅  hours of labor. We treat labor as the numeraire good, with a price 
of one, so costs, income, and prices are denominated in hours of labor. The central question is, 
how do we calculate the cost of an environmental regulation that changes the linear production 
technology so that it now costs p1 = p0 + c > p0 to produce each unit of energy?  
3.1.1.When Partial Equilibrium Is Right 
The simplest approach would be to conclude that given current production x0, the cost of 
the regulation is  0 cx ⋅ . Such an analysis might be the result of an impact analysis for a new 
regulation where little was known about the likely response of consumer demand for energy to 
higher prices. The calculation would be exactly right if in fact consumer demand were fixed. 
Why? With fixed demand for a good, any change in the price is equivalent to a lump-sum 
                                                 
19 That is, in the end what most analyses care about is the welfare of people (households). Given the indirect 
benefits to households of investment (in static models) and government spending, ad hoc assumptions are often 
made in general equilibrium analyses—for example, requiring investment and government spending to remain 
constant. 
20 Two alternatives to equivalent variation (EV) are discussed in the literature: compensating variation and 
Marshallian surplus. Freeman (1985) recommends EV because it represents the desired objective—a money 
equivalent of welfare change; see also Jorgenson and Slesnick (1985). The idea originated with Hicks (1942); 
Chipman and Moore (1980) show that EV represents an indirect utility function and is therefore appropriate for 
welfare comparisons. Resources for the Future  Pizer and Kopp  
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transfer—the consumer always pays for the good and then uses leftover income to buy other 
goods on the margin. The added cost of energy  0 cx ⋅  in this case is exactly like a  0 cx ⋅  loss of 
income available for other goods. Graphically, we can see this in the left panel of Figure 1, with 
vertical demand and horizontal supply curves. Here the area above the price line—the consumer 
surplus—falls by  0 cx ⋅  with the regulation, as indicated by the shaded area.21  
Even in this case, where the simple partial equilibrium analysis works, measures like 
GDP can be misleading. GDP can be viewed as a measure of either factor income or marketed 
final demand—in this case, wage income and purchases of energy. Wage income rises in this 
example, as the consumer works more to support her fixed demand—that is, GDP rises in 
response to a costly regulation. A more careful analysis might note that real energy use remained 
constant, but in no case would a study of GDP reveal a decline because the quantity of marketed 
goods remains the same in this example, and GDP does not capture changes in nonmarketed 
goods, such as leisure. 
Returning to the partial equilibrium analysis, input prices may not be perfectly elastic and 
demand may not be perfectly inelastic. For example, suppose the right panel in Figure 1 
describes demand for energy. The original analysis based on fixed energy demand would have 
overstated costs by ignoring the flexibility of the consumer to substitute away from an 
increasingly expensive good. A better analysis might correctly predict—or, after the regulation is 
in place, observe—x1 as the new demand for energy and conclude that costs equaled  1 cx ⋅ . This 
would reflect the current expenditures recorded by the power plant as being environmentally 
related. 
Such a calculation, an analysis of environmental expenditures after regulation is in place, 
is precisely the basis of the national cost estimates discussed in the first section, where firms are 
surveyed about their abatement expenditures.22 Yet such analyses routinely ignore the loss of 
consumer welfare associated with reduced consumption of more expensive, regulated goods—in 
our example, reduced energy demand from x0 to x1. In this way, they entirely miss the regulatory 
costs associated with goods that are banned or whose regulated costs become so high that no 
                                                 
21 Introductory economics teaches that changes in the area between the demand curve and the price line, referred to 
as consumer surplus, can be used to measure changes in consumer welfare as prices change. Intuitively, when the 
consumer is forced to pay more for the purchased good, it is as though that much income is being taken away, and as 
prices rise and demand falls, there will not be as much of an income loss for the next incremental price increase. 
22 For example, U.S, EPA (1990a), Rutledge and Vogan (1994), OECD (1999). Resources for the Future  Pizer and Kopp  
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production occurs and no control costs are reported. We can fix the calculation in our example 
relatively easily: the true welfare cost is the area under the demand curve between p = p0 and p = 
p1, or  ()
1
10 2 cx x ⋅+ ; that is, the change in consumer surplus.23 Note that again, the estimated 
change in GDP will likely be positive unless the decline from x0 to x1 is large. That is, the change 
in GDP equals  () 10 1 0 cx x x p ⋅− − . 
3.1.2.When Partial Equilibrium Is Wrong 
So far, the partial equilibrium cost analysis of environmental regulation in our simple 
model has done well when the consumer’s response is properly captured. However, we have yet 
to consider what happens when distortions, especially tax distortions, already exist in other 
markets. In this case, we have to consider not only costs in the regulated market, but also 
changes in existing costs measured in those other markets. 
Figure 2 shows the consequences of a new environmental regulation in the energy (left 
panel) and labor markets (right panel) in the presence of a preexisting tax on labor income. When 
the regulation is implemented, employment decreases from l0 to l1 while energy demand 
decreases from x0 to x1. The shaded region shows deadweight loss in both markets.24 The 
important thing to recognize is that the deadweight loss in the labor market changes as 
employment shifts from l0 to l1. That is, the environmental regulation not only creates a cost in 
the energy market where it is imposed, it also influences the cost of existing policies (a labor tax 
in this case) in other markets. 
One can make the example more precise algebraically. Consider the following utility 
function that underlies Figure 1 and Figure 2: 






ux l L l
−
= −+ −  (2) 
                                                 
23 Here the demand schedule is linear. The welfare analysis is not correct unless we are careful to use compensated 
(holding utility constant) rather than uncompensated (holding income constant) demand schedules. Note that as the 
price goes up by an initial increment dp, the cost of maintaining the current level of well-being rises—which we 
correctly measure as x0 dp. Now, we want to continue to measure the cost of maintaining that same level of well-
being as the price rises by the next increment, not the cost of maintaining the new, lower level of well-being 
associated with a higher price and fixed income. Therefore, the demand schedule must hold welfare, not income, 
constant. When preferences are quasi-linear (e.g., the marginal utility of one good equals unity), income and utility 
do not affect demand for any good other than the quasi-linear good, and both compensated and uncompensated 
demand schedules are the same. 
24 In both cases, we show compensated labor supplies, as remarked in the preceding footnote. Resources for the Future  Pizer and Kopp  
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where x is demand for energy, l is supply of labor (so L – l is demand for leisure), and x* is a 
parameter describing a level of satiation with energy. The consumer faces a budget constraint 
that now allows for distinction between the wage paid by the employer (unity) and the wage 
received by the consumer (w): 
  ( ) p xwLl w LT ⋅+⋅ − = ⋅+ (3) 
where expenditures on energy,  p x ⋅ , plus implied expenditures on leisure,  () wLl ⋅− , must equal 
the value of the labor endowment, wL ⋅ , plus any income transfer T from the government . With 
the wage paid by the power plant equal to one, we have w = 1 – t where t is the labor tax. The 
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providing a solution for energy demand and labor supply. This, in turn, allows us to write 
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 (5) 
where u is utility, v is the indirect utility function, and e is total expenditures, including leisure, 
and equal to wL T ⋅+ in (3).  
Previously, we asserted that the cost to consumers without a labor tax (when w = 1) 
equals  ()
1
10 2 cx x ⋅+  in Figure 1. Therefore, we should be able to see the following relation: 
  () ( ) ( )
1
0 no labor tax, no regulation 1 0 0 no labor tax, regulation 2 ,1, ,1, ep u c x x ep u −⋅ + =  (6) 
That is, if we took away  ()
1
10 2 cx x ⋅+  in income from the untaxed, unregulated expenditure 
level—keeping the prices the same—utility would fall to the same level created by the 
regulation. How can we see this in our model? Without taxes,  ( ) 0 no labor tax, no regulation ,1, ep u  equals 
() 0 no labor tax, regulation ,1, ep c u +  equals L. That is, the equilibrium expenditure level always equals the 
income level, and without taxes this always equals L.25 Therefore,  
                                                 
25 Note that the equilibrium expenditure in the face of particular policy equals the expenditure function evaluated at 
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But this equals  ()
1
10 2 cx x ⋅+  through manipulation of the expenditure function in (5), and so (6) 
is true.26 
With a preexisting labor tax, the calculation is slightly more complex. Again, we want to 
compute the change in income equivalent to the utility loss associated with the regulation—but 
now with a labor tax present, 
  () ( ) 0 labor tax, no regulation 0 labor tax, regulation ,, ? ,, epw u epw u −=   
analogous to (6). But unlike the untaxed case in (6), where equilibrium expenditures always 
equaled the same level of income L, equilibrium expenditures now equal wL T ⋅+, where T 
changes as we move from the unregulated to the regulated equilibrium. In equilibrium, we know 
that Tt l =⋅ because the government transfer must equal the tax revenue. Using this, we have  
  () ( ) ( ) 0 labor tax, no regulation 1 0 0 labor tax, regulation ,, ,, e p wu t l l e p cwu +⋅ − = +  
That is, the taxed equilibrium expenditure without regulation, plus the change in tax revenue 
associated with the regulation, equals the taxed equilibrium expenditure with regulation. As 
before,  () ( ) 0 labor tax,regulation 0 labor tax, regulation ,1, ,1, ep c u ep u +−  equals  ( )
1
10 2 cx x ⋅+ , so we have 
  () ( ) ( )( )
1
0 labor tax, no regulation 0 labor tax, regulation 1 0 1 0 2 ,, ,, epw u epw u c x x t l l −= ⋅ + + ⋅ −  (7) 
Intuitively, welfare cost equals the cost measured in the partial equilibrium energy market 
analysis, plus the change in employment times the tax wedge (e.g., the difference between the 
marginal benefit and marginal cost of an hour worked). 
How does this compare with simpler analyses? As before, we could imagine assuming 
that the before-regulation output level x = x0 remains fixed, that the after-regulation output level 
x = x1 remains fixed, or that output changes based on the compensated demand schedule. With 
per unit regulatory costs c, we would estimate partial equilibrium costs of  0 cx ⋅ ,  1 cx ⋅ , or 
()
1
10 2 cx x ⋅+ , respectively (the latter corresponds to the shaded area in the left panel of Figure 2). 
All of these estimates ignore costs in the labor market arising from the existing labor tax. 
                                                 
26 Note that () () () ( ) ( ) ( ) 00 0 0 0 0 1
11 1
22 2 ** 2 * 2 pc x pc p x p x pc c xx +− + −− = − − = ⋅ + . It is also evident by the 
definition of the compensated demand curve in Figure 2, which equals the derivative of the expenditure function 
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How does this compare with a general equilibrium calculation based on Figure 2? One 
could imagine using Figure 2 to compute the cost not only in the energy market but in the labor 
market as well—as we suggested at the beginning of this section. This would not be entirely 
correct, either. The compensated demand curves used for welfare analysis in these diagrams 
measure welfare consequences for price changes in their own markets. They cannot be used to 
accurately measure welfare changes in one market arising from price changes in another market 
because they are computed holding those other prices fixed. That is, adding the shaded region 
between l = l0 and l = l1 in the right panel of Figure 2 to the shaded area in the left panel of 
Figure 2 yields too small an estimate. 
Table 2 summarizes the variations we just went through and the consequences that would 
be measured based on various notions of costs. The first line shows the costs that might show up 
on a survey where firms were asked to report their expenditures on environmental protection. 
This ignores the change in production level that may be a result of the regulation. An accurate 
partial equilibrium analysis, on the second line, shows what a good analysis of the regulated 
market would yield. The third line shows how a model trained to measure GDP impacts would 
register costs (measurable as either the change in final goods sold or the change in production 
factors purchased). Finally, the fourth line shows the true welfare costs, measured as the loss of 
income that would lead to a welfare level equivalent to the imposed regulation—the equivalent 
variation in income. 
The key observation is that no measure of costs correctly measures welfare costs in all 
cases except the general equilibrium measure. This illustrates the first main point of Section 3. 
Namely, both the measurable costs to the firm in a single market as well as changes in GDP can 
be misleading measures of the real cost to consumers. Costs to the firm measured in a partial 
equilibrium analysis ignore general equilibrium changes in output and prices and miss potential 
welfare changes from altered production levels and distortions in other markets. Changes in GDP 
are misleading because they ignore the consumption of leisure and treat regulatory expenses as if 
they directly benefited consumers—as if they were expenditures on food or housing.  
The remainder of this section discusses both approximate and exact methods of 
measuring the costs of environmental regulation based on a general equilibrium model. This 
discussion builds up to the second main point of this section: an accurate measure of the total 
cost of environmental regulation depends on a complete model of technology, preferences, and 
government behavior. Different assumptions about these features of the economy can lead to 
different estimates of the impact of environmental regulation. Resources for the Future  Pizer and Kopp  
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3.2. Extended Market Analysis 
A central failure of simple partial equilibrium analysis is its inability to handle price and 
output changes in related markets. Therefore, one solution is to extend the analysis to markets 
related vertically or horizontally (Just et al. 1982; Whalley 1975; Kokoski and Smith 1987). A 
vertically expanded analysis would involve computing the input factor supply schedules, rather 
than treating input prices as fixed, and computing consumer and producer surplus loss in those 
markets. In the horizontal case, this would involve computing a demand schedule for the output 
of the firm undertaking environmental activities, rather than assuming output remains fixed, and 
then using that schedule to compute a change in surplus.  
Although such extensions would seem to offer improvements, that is not the case 
empirically. Whalley (1975) computes the effect of capital tax reform in the United Kingdom 
and finds that extending the partial equilibrium to include horizontal effects worsens most of the 
welfare estimates relative to the true social costs. In an environmental example, Kokoski and 
Smith (1987) examine the cost of unmitigated global warming. In separate horizontal and 
vertical extensions to a simple partial equilibrium analysis, they find that both are considerably 
worse when only one market is affected by global warming. When multiple markets are affected 
by global warming, the extensions do better. 
In our earlier example, summarized in Table 2, an extended market analysis helps. By 
considering the substitution opportunities in the leisure market, an extended market analysis 
would properly capture the welfare effects in the cases without taxes. With taxes, however, this 
approach fails to capture welfare loss in the labor market. An increase in the consumption of 
leisure (and decrease in labor supply) due to substitution exacerbates the deadweight loss 
associated with the labor tax. These effects are ignored by the extended market analysis. 
3.3. Approximating Losses in Other Markets 
An alternative to these limited extensions is to consider an approximation based on the 
effect in all markets, focused on deadweight loss. Both Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) and 
Harberger (1971) provide guidance, suggesting expressions of the form: 




=−− − ∑ aa , (8) 
where as before the vector a parameterizes the policy,  ( ) ( ) 0 jj CC − a  is the loss of social surplus 
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remaining markets ij ≠ , and  () ( ) 0 ii XX − a  indicates the change in output in each of those 
markets due to the policy.27  
Note that when we apply (8) to our example in Section 3.1, it delivers the correct answer 
with a preexisting labor tax. In addition to the partial equilibrium cost in the energy market, 
shown in the left panel of Figure 1 and equal to ( )
1
10 2 cx x ⋅+ , we have costs in the labor market 
equal to the labor tax t times the change in labor supply,l1 – l0. This yields the correct welfare 
cost  () ( )
1
10 1 0 2 cx xt l l ⋅+ + ⋅ − . With a single representative consumer and a convex production 
technology, we can develop a more explicit expression for (8). Suppose y is the vector of (net) 
goods produced by the firm, and x is the vector of (net) goods consumed by the consumer. We 
can define Y as the matrix of first derivatives of y with respect to producer prices p and S as the 
matrix of compensated first derivatives of x with respect to consumer prices q.28 Suppose a is 
simply a description of the amount of pollution abated—a scalar a—and let abatement of that 
pollutant be good j in the above description. Consider a small change in pollution abated, da. If 
we assume that the existing distortions  = − tqp  do not change, we have dd =⋅ xSp  (assuming 
no change in utility) and dd =⋅ y Yp  with dd = pq . If we also assume that the existing excess 
supply (government and/or foreign supply),  − y x, remains constant, we have  j dde d a −= yx  
where ej is unit vector j. Combining these relations, we have (since taxes are fixed) 
  ()
1
j dd e d a
− ==− pqY S  
The actual change in consumption would be given by 
  ()
1
j dd e d a
− =⋅ = − xSpS YS  (9) 
 Normally, marginal changes in consumption have no effect on welfare since, at the 
margin, producer cost equals consumer benefit. In the presence of distortionary taxes, however, 
consumer benefit exceeds producer cost by the tax rate. Increased consumption will raise 
                                                 
27 See Equation (92) in Diamond and Mirrlees; Equation (5′′′ ) in Harberger. Diamond and Mirrlees present marginal 
conditions for optimal provision of a public good, where their marginal cost expression equals the derivative of the 
right-hand side of (8) with respect to a, replacing marginal partial equilibrium costs Cj’ with the derivative of an 
aggregate production function with respect to the regulated good Gj (they use k as the regulated good). In this way, 
we view Equation (8) as a discrete approximation to the cost side of Diamond and Mirrlees, and in turn an 
approximate metric for comparison with monetized benefits. The comparison with Harberger is more 
straightforward, as he is already focused on a discrete approximation. The only difference is that his expression for 
the cost of a tax in market j, 
* 1
2 jj Tx ∆  is replaced by our cost of the regulation in market j,  () () 0
jj CC − a . 
28 Note that this approach requires strict convexity in production and preferences. Resources for the Future  Pizer and Kopp  
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welfare; decreased consumption will lower welfare. To compute the change in welfare, we 
multiply change in consumption (9) by the tax rate:  
  ()
1
j de d a
− ⋅= ⋅ − txt S YS     
This is exactly the second term in (8) as derived by Bruce and Harris (1982) in their 
analysis of cost-benefit criteria for evaluating small projects.29 Rather than applying a marginal 
cost-benefit analysis to the incremental cost of producing a,  ( ) j Ca ′ , this suggests that we should 
base our analysis on  
  () ( )
1
jj Ca e
− ′ −⋅ − tSY S , (10) 
adjusting for surplus changes in other markets. Diewert (1983) extends this approach even 
further, considering the effect of import tariffs for a small open economy. 
As the preceding discussion suggests, it is not easy to estimate  ( )( ) 0 ii XX − a , the effect 
of a particular policy in every market. This requires a local model of general equilibrium effects, 
captured by Y and S in (10). However, as Harberger (1971) notes, the only real concern will be 
those markets that have large distortions (ti) and are significantly affected by the policy (large 
i X ∆ ). Interestingly, this bit of intuition has pervaded a large volume of literature on the 
importance of general equilibrium analysis over the intervening 30 years.30 
3.4. General Equilibrium Analysis 
Efforts to include social costs outside the directly regulated market lead naturally to 
general equilibrium cost analyses. Where the previous approach in (10) uses linear 
approximations of preferences and technology to work out new equilibria, a general equilibrium 
model works directly with utility and profit functions, maximizing both subject to market 
equilibrium conditions. A general equilibrium model can also be used to consider alternative 
assumptions about taxes and spending (where the previous approach assumed fixed tax rates and 
fixed government purchases). 
                                                 
29 See Equation (7) in Bruce and Harris (1982). 
30 In a recent article on the use of “Harberger triangles,” Hines (1999) notes that despite the criticism that analysis 
based on such triangles ignores general equilibrium effect, Harberger himself consistently emphasized the 
importance of spillover effects in distorted markets. Resources for the Future  Pizer and Kopp  
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General equilibrium analyses can involve both numerical simulation and analytic results. 
Analytic work on general equilibrium problems has focused on establishing conditions for 
second-best optima and the prices appropriate for marginal project evaluation. Just as Harberger 
and others revealed the importance of costs associated with tax distortions, this work has 
revealed the importance of fiscal responses to environmental and other public policies. It is 
always possible—and frequently necessary—to adjust taxes or spending in response to nonfiscal 
policies. The necessity arises from the need to maintain the government budget constraint as the 
tax base changes. These adjustments can have significant welfare consequences. 
Consider a simple model with a single consumer, a single firm, and a government. The 
consumer has endowment k and utility u(x), where both k and x are N element vectors spanning 
the good and factor space of the economy. The firm possesses a constant-returns-to-scale 
technology with unit profit function π(p) that is operated at an arbitrary scale α, provided profit 
is nonnegative based on producer prices p. Finally, the government collects taxes on commodity 
transactions between the consumer and firm. The government also purchases a fixed bundle of 
goods g with any government balance (negative or positive), resulting in a transfer to the 
consumer b. Letting e(p + t, u) be the expenditure function dual of u(x) for consumer prices p + 
t, we can write the equilibrium conditions as: 
Household budget: e(p + t, u) = b + (p + t) · k  (11) 
Government budget: t · x(p + t, u) = b + p · g  
Zero profit: p · y(p) = 0     
Market clearing: y(p) α + k = g + x(p + t, u),      
where utility u, producer prices p, output scale α, and government transfers b adjust to reach an 
equilibrium. By Walras law, one of the budget or market-clearing equations is redundant. To fix 
the nominal variables p, t, and b, one price must also be fixed as numeraire. A typical approach 
is to fix first good as numeraire (p1 = 1) and to drop the market-clearing constraint on that first 
good. This model is a simplified version of the kinds of models used for analytic and numerical 
work on public good provision in a second-best general equilibrium setting (Diamond and 
Mirrlees 1971; Diewert 1983; Stiglitz and Dasgupta 1971; Bovenberg and Goulder 1996; 
Rutherford 1999). 
An important observation about these equilibrium conditions is that to close the model, it 
is necessary to make an additional assumption about how the government meets its budget 
constraint. In all, the model (11) involves N + 1 endogenous variables—p (except p1), u, and α—Resources for the Future  Pizer and Kopp  
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and N + 2 equations (recall that one is dropped by Walras law). One additional degree of 
freedom must be introduced among the otherwise fixed government variables, t, g, or b. The 
approximation in (10) assumed that taxes and government purchases were fixed, thereby 
endogenizing government transfers b by default. Alternatively, b can be fixed and the tax rates 
can be chosen optimally subject to the budget constraint. Or, any one of the tax rates can be 
allowed to adjust and b can be fixed.31 When we consider policy evaluations, these different 
assumptions often have important consequences for the implied welfare change. 
Using this model, the cost associated with providing some incremental amount of a 
public good  j de d e = g  can be computed two ways. In an analytic model, we can maximize u 
subject to the above constraints. If γ is the Lagrange multiplier on the government budget 
constraint, and ρj is the Lagrange multiplier on the jth market-clearing constraint, the social cost 
of the incremental public good will be 
  ( ) jj p de γρ +  (12)   
In a numerical simulation model we can simulate the change du as we increase g by dg. Using a 
money-metric utility scaling (Samuelson 1974) such that e(q, u) = u at the initial equilibrium, du 
can be interpreted as the equivalent variation cost of the policy for a small dg.  
Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971), Ballard and Fullerton (1992), and others use the analytic 
approach to derive results with optimal taxes and no transfers. They show that the cost of a 
public good equals its price multiplied by one plus the marginal excess burden of the tax system. 
From expression (12), optimal tax policy must imply that ρj is proportional to pj if this rule is 
going to hold for all goods j. This is similar to the results of Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994) and 
Bovenberg and Goulder (1996), who consider optimal Pigouvian taxes on pollution in the 
presence of distortionary taxes. Work by Bruce and Harris (1982) and Diewert (1983) reveals the 
form of ρj when taxes are instead exogenous and transfers adjust.  In contrast to Stiglitz and 
Dasgupta, they find ρ to be a matrix-weighted average of producer and consumer prices.32 
Boadway (1975) provides guidance when some taxes are fixed and other taxes adjust.  
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3.5. Numerical Analysis 
Analytical models are limited by the need for tractability. Numerical models, however, 
are limited only by computational power. An early example of numerical general equilibrium 
analysis is Ballard et al. (1985), who use a numerical general equilibrium model of the U.S. 
economy to estimate marginal excess tax burdens ranging from 17 to 56 cents on the dollar. 
Environmental applications of numerical general equilibrium models include Conrad and 
Schröder (1991), Bergman (1991), Whalley and Wigle (1991), and Böhringer and Rutherford 
(1997). Bergman considers the loss of gross national product (GNP) and marginal control cost of 
SO2, NOx, and CO2 in Sweden. Conrad and Schröder use a computable general equilibrium 
model to estimate the carbon tax required to generate a specified annual emissions reduction and 
then measure the impacts on GNP and SO2 and NOx emissions in Germany. Böhringer and 
Rutherford also consider carbon policies in Germany, but unlike Bergman and Conrad and 
Schröder, they focus on welfare consequences. Similarly, Whalley and Wigle consider global 
consequences of CO2 reductions with an emphasis on welfare as well as changes in patterns of 
trade. 
When the control costs used in general equilibrium analyses are based on surveys of 
regulatory expense, there is often little information concerning the removal process or input 
substitutions used to reduce emissions. Consequently, most models make simplifying 
assumptions about abatement technology: either input usage for abatement is proportional to 
overall input usage33 (Jorgenson and Wilcoxen 1990; Hazilla and Kopp 1990), or abatement 
involves only capital and labor (Ballard and Medema 1993). Recent work by Nestor and Pasurka 
(1995) demonstrates the potential problems with that approach, using detailed information on 
abatement technology (Schäfer and Stahmer 1989). They find that although simplifying 
assumptions about abatement technology lead to similar conclusions about which sectors are 
most adversely affected by regulation (based on declines in output), the magnitudes are 
significantly different. The proportional input model tends to underestimate output changes, but 
the capital-labor model overestimates output changes. This occurs, the authors argue, because the 
primary factor (capital-labor) intensity of the actual expenditures lies between the primary factor 
intensity implied by the proportional input and capital-labor models. 
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3.6. Environmental Policy versus Public Good Provision 
The question of optimal provision of public goods motivated many of the analytic 
exercises we have mentioned (Diamond and Mirrlees 1971; Diewert 1983; Stiglitz 1979). These 
studies focused on the problem of procuring market goods for public use and on the appropriate 
way to value those goods, leading to Equation (8) and subsequent variations. In contrast, 
environmental regulation focuses on nonmarket goods and frequently involves the manipulation 
of property rights. For example, emissions standards may restrict the right of firms to emit above 
a certain rate without any direct market consequence. 
The intuition behind Equation (8) is the same in both cases, however. There is one market 
where the public policy imposes primary losses of social surplus. In the first case, increased 
government consumption of a particular good raises production costs in that market in order to 
increase output. In the second case, environmental regulation raises production costs in the 
regulated firms’ output market while the output level remains the same. The first term in (8) 
reflects these direct costs. In response to these changes, there will be equilibrating effects in 
other markets. Tax-induced discrepancies between the marginal cost and marginal benefit of 
goods in those markets lead to welfare changes reflected in the second term in (8). 
When market mechanisms are used to reduce pollution, we can focus on the pollution 
market directly, rather than the output market for regulated firms. The initial factor supply curve 
in this market is flat and passes through the origin—equilibrium emissions set marginal 
abatement costs equal to zero. The direct cost of any regulation is the change in area under the 
pollution demand curve or the integral  ( ) p ad a ∫ , where a measures the quantity abated and p(a) 
is the market price at abatement level a (or the tax required to induce abatement level a). Indirect 
welfare changes, as before, are computed as the sum of changes in consumption times the tax 
rate in each market. 
The use of market-based mechanisms—tradable permits and emissions taxes—changes 
the otherwise straightforward application of earlier results from public finance. In addition to 
encouraging abatement and creating pollution control costs, these mechanisms also associate 
costs with uncontrolled emissions. These costs reflect the value of permits or taxes associated 
with unabated emissions. In other words, firms must pay for their inframarginal emissions, not 
just the emissions they reduce. Yet these costs on inframarginal emissions are not really costs at 
all—they are transfers to whoever owns the emission property rights. This could be firm owners, 
consumers, or the government. In either case, this transfer is an ancillary feature of market-based 
environmental regulation that is not present in the standard case of public good provision. Resources for the Future  Pizer and Kopp  
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Goulder et al. (1998) discuss the different outcomes created by market and nonmarket 
mechanisms. 
Goulder et al. (1997) echoes our earlier analysis and notes that environmental regulations 
can lead to large deadweight losses in the labor market—distinct from the out-of-pocket costs of 
environmental regulation—if labor taxes are high and labor supply declines (even a small 
amount) in response to the regulation. This is an important point to bear in mind when 
considering the ability to raise government revenue (via permit auctions or tax payments). 
Revenue raised by market-based policies can reduce the social cost of environmental policies if 
the new revenue is used to offset tax distortions elsewhere in the economy. 
Recognition that market-based regulatory mechanisms can be used to raise government 
revenue, and that this revenue can be used to reduce existing taxes and lower the economy’s 
overall tax and regulatory burden, has lead to an explosive amount of research into so-called 
revenue recycling. This research in turn has lent additional credibility to arguments for the 
auctioning of emissions permits rather than allocating them gratis.  
3.7. The Double Dividend 
The potential for revenue-raising environmental regulation to both reduce pollution and 
lower the cost of the tax system has been referred to as a double dividend. Specifically, the 
second dividend is the reduction in tax distortions caused by the replacement of undesirable taxes 
on labor and capital with environmentally beneficial taxes on pollution (Pearce 1991). However, 
this remains an empirical question: setting aside any environmental benefit, can the substitution 
of taxes on pollution for existing taxes in fact lower the distortionary cost of the tax system as a 
whole? 
Goulder (1995b) points out that there are several versions of the double dividend. The 
weak version argues that the tax swap (green taxes replace conventional taxes) raises welfare 
relative to an identical environmental tax policy that returns the revenue lump-sum. In contrast, 
the strong version argues that swapping environmental taxes for a typical or representative 
distortionary tax (e.g., labor) is either welfare-neutral or welfare-improving relative to the no-
policy alternative. Resources for the Future  Pizer and Kopp  
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The weak form of the double dividend hypothesis is relatively uncontroversial. As 
Goulder explains, as long as existing taxes are indeed distortionary, using new revenue to reduce 
such distortions—versus returning it lump-sum—must reduce the distortion and therefore raise 
welfare relative to the case where the revenue is returned lump-sum.34 This is the main point of 
Goulder et al. (1997). The stronger forms, however, have provoked considerable debate. An 
important insight comes from Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994), who demonstrate that the 
hypothesis hinges on the sign of the uncompensated elasticity of labor supply. A negative 
elasticity supports the hypothesis; a positive elasticity rejects it. With most empirical studies 
favoring positive values (Hausman 1985), this has been viewed as substantial evidence against 
the strong version of the double dividend hypothesis.35 
Nonetheless, the Bovenberg and de Mooij result is based on a relatively simple model 
that ignores many features of the economy and the tax code. Bovenberg and van der Ploeg 
(1996) consider a model with involuntary unemployment and find more support for the strong 
double dividend. Simulation results from more complex economic models summarized in 
Goulder (1995b) lean against the strong version of the double dividend hypothesis, but the 
evidence is mixed. Most of the results indicate that substitution of environmental taxes for other 
taxes lowers welfare, though several indicate marginal losses or welfare improvements. 
Therefore, despite a general sentiment against the strong double dividend hypothesis, the 
question remains open.  
3.8. Dynamic General Equilibrium Analysis 
Static models are limited by the fact that they provide a snapshot of policy consequences 
at a single point in time. Since the cost of an environmental policy may vary over time, a single 
snapshot can be misleading. Static models are also limited by their inability to model savings and 
investment correctly. Savings and investment decisions reflect a trade-off among consumption in 
different periods of time. Since investment is a significant portion of final demand, static models 
may not even present an accurate snapshot of the period they attempt to describe, if there is a 
large impact on investment—a point made via the example at the beginning of the section. 
                                                 
34 Although the efficiency properties of lump-sum versus distortionary taxes are uncontroversial, the equity 
properties are not. Kaplow (1996) provides an example of such concerns. 
35 A recent paper by Jaeger (2000) argues against the Bovenberg and de Mooij result but has not been widely 
accepted. Resources for the Future  Pizer and Kopp  
  30
One approach to dynamic analysis is solving a system of linked static equilibrium 
models, as demonstrated by Ballard et al. (1985) and Conrad and Schröder (1991). These models 
involve a myopic, intertemporal trade-off where consumers assume the current return to capital 
investment is fixed. True dynamic general equilibrium models, however, solve these problems 
by simultaneously satisfying market equilibrium and budget constraints in every period.  
In our model (11), three modifications are required. First, we index quantities and prices 
over both goods and time. Second, we have to consider utility over both goods and time, 
resulting in an intertemporal expenditure function. Third, our endowments k are fixed in the 
zeroeth period but otherwise evolve based on investment i, an additional element of final 
demand. The modified model becomes 
Household budget: e(p + t, u) = b + (p0 + t0) · k0  (13) 
Government budget: t · x(p + t, u) = b + p · g  
Zero profit: pt · y(pt) = 0     
Market clearing: y(pt) αt + kt = gt + xt(p + t, u) + it 
Capital accumulation: kt+ 1 = (I – ∆ )kt + f(it ), 
where I is the identity matrix and ∆ is a diagonal matrix of depreciation rates. Note that the 
household and government budget constraints are now intertemporal constraints, based on the 
intertemporal prices p. The vector-valued function f() describes the tranformation of investment 
goods into new capital. This could be a simple linear relationship describing how outputs in one 
period become inputs the next period. Or it could be a convex relationship representing the 
adjustment costs associated with rapid increases in the capital stock. Finally, we note that this 
general specification allows for multiple capital stocks that may be malleable between uses. 
Models of the form (13) are not generally solvable using analytic means and are instead 
solved by numerical algorithms (Codsi et al. 1992; Lipton and et al. 1982; Rutherford 1999). 
Hazilla and Kopp (1990) and Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1990) provide the best examples of 
dynamic general equilibrium modeling applied to environmental regulation. The main finding of 
those studies is that static productivity losses due to environmental regulation are amplified by 
the long-term effect on capital accumulation. Intuitively, environmental regulation lowers the 
marginal product of capital. In the long term, this leads to a lower capital stock, decreased 
output, and reduced welfare. The additional cost of this accumulation effect on welfare can be as 
much as 40% above the static cost that ignores changes in the capital stock. Resources for the Future  Pizer and Kopp  
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When we consider the transition between unregulated and regulated regimes, 
assumptions about capital stock malleability become important. Models are frequently 
categorized as either “putty-putty” when they assume a single capital stock that can be moved 
costlessly between uses (see, for example, Hazilla and Kopp 1990 and Jorgenson and Wilcoxen 
1990) or “putty-clay” when they assume specialized capital stocks that must be retired and 
replaced (Atkeson and Kehoe 1999) or incorporate convex adjustment costs (Goulder 1995a). 
This is especially relevant for recent applications concerning the prospective costs of climate 
change mitigation efforts (Jorgenson and Wilcoxen 1993; Goulder 1995a; Weyant and Hill 1999; 
McKibbin et al. 1999). Although Jorgenson and Wilcoxen require taxes of $25 per ton of carbon 
emissions in 2020 to stabilize emissions at 1990 levels, Goulder requires a tax of $50 per ton. 
This partially reflects Goulder’s adjustment cost specification vis-à-vis the putty-putty 
specification in Jorgenson and Wilcoxen. The possibility of significant adjustment costs due to 
less malleable capital stocks emphasizes the importance of dynamic efficiency in long-term 
stabilization efforts, referred to as “when flexibility” by Wigley (1996).  
3.9. Other “Costs” in General Equilibrium Models 
The attention given to specific areas of public concern—productivity growth, 
employment, and trade—has led to an emphasis on these issues as alternative measures of “cost.” 
Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1990), for example, focus on the growth consequences associated with 
environmental regulation rather than welfare measures—even though their general equilibrium 
model can measure welfare effects. Other studies employ nongeneral equilibrium models to 
compute these effects. Christainsen and Havemen (1981) survey a collection of studies on the 
productivity slowdown of the 1970s and conclude that perhaps 8–12% of the slowdown can be 
attributed to environmental regulation. A more recent survey of the literature by U.S. Office of 
Technology Assessment (1994) concluded that as much as 44% might be attributable to 
environmental protection in individual industries. Looking at specific industries, Barbera and 
McConnell (1990) attribute 10–30% of the slowdown to environmental regulations. More recent 
concerns have included trade impacts (McKibbin et al. 1999) and labor consequences 
(Morgenstern et al. 1998). Resources for the Future  Pizer and Kopp  
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4.  Distribution of Costs 
Cost and cost-benefit analyses of environmental regulation tend to focus on aggregate 
consequences. Yet these consequences are not evenly distributed among all members of society. 
For many reasons, the distribution of consequences and, specifically, costs is important. 
First and foremost, most societies have some desire for equality and fairness. This is 
revealed by the existence of, for example, civil rights, progressive income taxes, and welfare 
programs. Equality can be defined in many ways and is subject to intense debate. Regardless of 
the definition, however, the costs associated with a particular regulation or program can be held 
to the definition and evaluated. The same evaluation can also be used to design compensatory 
schemes to redress identified inequalities. 
In cases of international environmental policy, the distribution of costs across countries is 
a point of negotiation. Notions of equality and fairness play an important role in the design of 
international agreements, with the additional complication that countries participate voluntarily. 
This makes a careful analysis even more important, as no supranational authority exists to 
resolve differences. 
Even without a desire for fairness, there are frequently practical considerations that 
motivate a focus on distribution. When costs are narrowly focused on a few stakeholders—such 
as restrictions on Northwest logging companies to protect wildlife habitats, or restrictions on 
chemical companies manufacturing chlorofluorocarbons to protect stratospheric ozone—those 
stakeholders are likely to be more vocal than when costs are spread over a diffuse group. It often 
makes sense for policymakers to work with these stakeholders to design policies that at least 
minimize their distress.36 
Practical concerns often become political concerns, especially when costs are 
concentrated geographically. Concentration of costs may arise because of a concentration of 
polluting raw materials (coal mines in West Virginia), a concentration of energy-intensive or 
pollution-intensive productive activities (steel mills in Pennsylvania), or a concentration of 
consumers of energy-intensive or pollution-intensive final goods (heavy use of home heating oil 
in New England). All of these effects are ameliorated to the extent that environmental benefits 
are primarily local, raising questions of environmental federalism (Oates and Schwab 1996). 
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Finally, environmental policies frequently transcend generations, with one generation 
bearing the costs and another the benefits (e.g., current mitigation efforts to prevent future global 
warming). Unlike the previous distributional concerns, there are currently no advocates for future 
generations to draw attention to equity, practical, or political issues. Nonetheless, concern over 
this generational equity continues to influence the policy process. 
In the remainder of this section, we summarize different approaches for measuring the 
distribution of regulatory costs broken down by household, sector, region, and generation. 
4.1. Impacts by Household 
Given the pervasiveness and magnitude of environmental regulation, one would think 
that comprehensive studies of the cost and benefit distribution of these policies would be 
bountiful. Ironically, the contrary is true. What does exist is a small set of fairly straightforward 
analyses of price changes and the effect of those changes on household budgets, coupled with an 
even smaller number of sophisticated general equilibrium studies. 
A recent study by Metcalf (1999) provides one kind of analysis. Metcalf uses input-
output tables to construct estimates of the pollution content of different commodities purchased 
by consumers. Under a proposed green tax reform that would tax consumption in proportion to 
its pollution content, he can then estimate effective rates on each commodity. Finally, he 
constructs consumption bundles differentiated by income, marital status, and age based on the 
Consumer Expenditure Survey.37 Combining these calculations, he is able to compute the tax 
burden for different demographic groups. In a report by the Congressional Budget Office (2000), 
similar calculations are carried out concerning the cost to different income groups of a $100-per-
ton carbon tax. Bull et al. (1994) consider the impact of both a carbon tax and a Btu tax on 
households differentiated by income and Census region.38 
These studies indicate that pollution taxes in isolation tend to be regressive, with poorer 
households spending a larger fraction of their income on environmental taxes. As Metcalf points 
out, compensatory reductions in income and payroll taxes targeted at poorer households can 
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38 There are four Census regions for individuals in urban areas (West, Northeast, South, and Midwest), plus rural. Resources for the Future  Pizer and Kopp  
  34
offset the regressive effect. Of course, alternative tax reforms could further heighten the 
regressivity.39 
Dowlatabadi et al. (1995) consider a different question. Instead of broad consumption 
bundles, they focus on differences in energy consumption. They analyze energy price increases 
arising from carbon taxes and trace the impact of these price increases through three alternative 
household energy demand models, which vary by region. Results of this exercise suggest that 
costs (in terms of household energy expenditures) between the lowest- and the highest-cost 
region differ by as much as 45%. 
4.2. Households, General Equilibrium, and Social Welfare 
The preceding examples provide cost estimates differentiated by household but ignore the 
general equilibrium considerations discussed in Section 3. General equilibrium analysis of 
distributional impacts is complicated by both data and computational requirements. Two 
approaches have emerged. One considers restricted models of household preferences that (owing 
to the restrictions) can be combined easily into a model of aggregate behavior (though not 
necessarily via a representative agent; see Jorgenson et al. 1980). The general equilibrium model 
can be solved using the simplified model of aggregate behavior, and then individual demand and 
welfare can be recovered afterward. Jorgenson et al. (1992) use this approach to study the impact 
of carbon taxes on the economic welfare of 1,344 distinct household types. Similarly, Aasness et 
al. (1996) consider the effect of environmental taxes in Norway.  
A second approach is to model explicitly the behavior of distinct households. In our 
earlier general equilibrium model (11), we need to specify distinct endowments for each 
household. We then add one equation (a household budget constraint) and one endogenous 
variable (utility) for each additional household, leading to a modified model, 
Household budgets: ej(p + t, uj) = bj + (p + t) · kj (14) 
Government budget: Σj t · xj(p + t, uj) = Σj bj + p · g  
Zero profit: p · y(p) = 0     
Market clearing: y(p) z + Σj kj = g + Σj xj(p + t, uj),      
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where the definitions are identical to (11) except that household utility (uj), expenditures (ej), 
lump-sum transfers (bj), and demand (xj) are now indexed over households j. 
The down side to this approach is that computational constraints limit the number of 
distinct households. For that reason, it is not usually applied to disaggregate analysis. Such 
models are, however, the standard approach to multiregion, international general equilibrium 
analyses, discussed in the next section. 
In addition to modeling the welfare of distinct households, Jorgenson et al. (1992) also 
consider the question of how to quantify in an internally consistent manner society’s aversion to 
inequality. They develop a social welfare function with many desirable properties and then use 
this function to measure the social cost, inclusive of equity concerns.40 Depending on the 
aversion to inequality, they find a welfare loss of $187 billion to $249 billion—suggesting that 
equity concerns alone might increase the social cost of policies by a third. 
4.3. Multicountry Analysis 
Modeling distributional effects across countries or regions is entirely analogous to 
measuring distributional effects across households. Regions have their own endowments and 
then trade on international markets. Thanks to recent interest in modeling mitigation efforts to 
reduce global climate change, a host of such disaggregated global models exist. A recent special 
issue of Energy Journal (Weyant and Hill 1999) presents results from more than a dozen models 
simulating the consequences of the Kyoto Protocol. 
 The Second Generation Model (MacCracken et al. 1999), for example, has been used to 
study the impact of different implementations of the Kyoto Protocol. In particular, the model is 
capable of estimating regional costs associated with various assumptions about international 
trading of emissions permits and the supply of additional emissions rights from developing 
countries. They demonstrate that substantial cost savings—for all countries—are possible with 
international permit trading. Similar analyses are carried out by McKibbin et al. (1999), with a 
particular emphasis on trade flows and exchange rate appreciation. They argue that the Kyoto 
Protocol leads to significant exchange rate appreciation in developing countries, fed by an 
increase in capital inflows and possibly the export of emissions credits. While boosting 
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developing country income, this has a Dutch disease effect, whereby the higher exchange rate 
makes their exports less competitive on world markets.  They report a decline in developing 
countries’ exports of approximately 20%. Other international models with regional detail have 
been used to address costs associated with capital malleability (Jacoby and Wing 1999), 
incentives for regional participation (Peck and Teisberg 1999), and cost-effectiveness (Nordhaus 
and Boyer 1999), among other topics. 
4.4. Impacts by Sector 
Within the United States (and we expect elsewhere), the economic analysis of a proposed 
environmental regulation begins with a quantification of the direct compliance cost. To the 
extent that most major regulations have focused on commercial activities, these compliance costs 
are borne by production sectors of the economy. As a consequence, production sector studies of 
regulatory cost are quite common, considerably more so than household-level studies. 
The vast majority of these studies consider only the costs borne by the directly regulated 
sector(s). Since 1973, the Pollution Abatement Cost and Expenditure Report has provided 
detailed information on expenditures by different sectors in the United States (Bureau of the 
Census 1973-1997). Since 1975, the Bureau of Economic Analysis has supplemented that report 
with its own analysis (Vogan 1996). Germany has reported even more detailed information, 
beginning in 1980 (Schäfer and Stahmer 1989). These studies consistently identify the same 
sectors as spending the most per dollar of revenue: steel, petroleum refining, plastics, and paper, 
to name a few. 
In many cases this is adequate for the purposes of assessing differential impact. However, 
in the case of large regulatory programs, especially programs that affect important economic 
sectors (e.g., energy), secondary impacts can be significant. In a series of papers beginning with 
Hazilla and Kopp (1990) and Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1990), large-scale, multisector, 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) models were used to examine the costs of environmental 
regulation and to assess the distribution of those costs across different sectors of economy. Both 
Hazilla-Kopp and Jorgenson-Wilcoxen assessed the impact of the U.S. Clean Air and Clean 
Water acts. In addition to estimates of macroeconomic changes, these structurally similar models 
enabled one to model changes in total cost, output, employment, and capital accumulation 
resulting from environmental regulation, and to do so in a dynamic setting. 
The results of these models revealed the wide range of sectoral impacts brought about by 
major regulatory programs. One example illustrates the point. Hazilla and Kopp report that in Resources for the Future  Pizer and Kopp  
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1990 the output of the finance, insurance, and real estate sector was almost 5% lower than it 
would have been in the absence of the Clean Air and Clean Water regulations and that 
employment declined 2.5%. These are costs borne by a sector that had no direct compliance cost 
whatsoever. 
New CGE models take the analysis of regulation and sectoral impacts into the realm of 
policy design. Current debates over global climate change and the policy measures needed to 
restrict the emissions of greenhouse gases acknowledge that, at least in the near term, these 
polices will be focused on the combustion of fossil fuels—most notably coal consumed in 
electricity generation. Efforts to restrict carbon emissions severely will impact the coal mining 
and processing sector, electricity utilities, and to some extent, other fossil energy industries. A 
recent study by Bovenberg and Goulder (2000) uses a CGE model to examine the impact of 
carbon taxes. In particular, it determines the level of compensation that would be required to 
compensate capital owners in the energy sector for their losses. Climate policies that generate 
revenues (e.g., carbon taxes or auctioned permits) could then be combined with compensation 
schemes to address directly the sectoral cost distribution issue. 
It is important to bear in mind that not all environmental regulations have negative 
sectoral impacts. Cap-and-trade permit policies can generate large rents for regulated sectors if 
permits are allocated on a gratis basis. The point has recently been made by Bovenberg and 
Goulder (2000). 
4.5. Impacts by Region 
Many studies of distribution by household also consider regional effects.  Jorgenson et al. 
(1992), Dowlatabadi et al. (1995), and Bull et al. (1994) all discuss impacts at broad regional 
levels (between four and nine regions) in the United States. More detailed impacts of broad, 
national policy initiatives are difficult because detailed data are lacking. Of course, case studies 
of narrow regulatory efforts are often sufficiently detailed to identify actual payees (e.g., Deck 
1997). 
A related line of work has explored whether environmental regulation influences the 
choice of plant location. Such choices could have significant local economic impacts that would 
appear in few, if any, of the cost measures discussed so far. Studies by Bartik (1988), Low and 
Yeats (1992), and Crandall (1993) suggest that firms are sensitive, in general terms, to cost 
variations among states when deciding where to locate new facilities. However, there is little 
direct evidence of a relationship between stringency of environmental regulation and plant Resources for the Future  Pizer and Kopp  
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location choices. In an analysis that includes measures of environmental stringency, Bartik found 
that neither measures of expenditures nor emissions standards had significant effects on plant 
location decisions. These results are similar to those of Levinson (1996) and McConnell and 
Schwab (1990), although Levinson did find that the locations of new branch plants of large 
multiplant companies in pollution-intensive industries were somewhat sensitive to differences in 
regulations. In contrast, a recent study by Gray (1996) finds that states with more stringent 
regulation (measured by a variety of state-specific measures) have fewer plant openings.  
Rather than directly examining plant location decisions, other work has compared rates of 
manufacturing employment growth—not just new plants—in attainment areas versus 
nonattainment areas. Papers by Henderson (1996) and Kahn (1997) found relatively lower 
growth rates in manufacturing employment in nonattainment counties, compared with those that 
attained the air quality standard. Becker and Henderson (1997) found that environmental 
regulation reduced births and increased deaths in nonattainment areas, shifting polluting activity 
to cleaner areas. With a similar approach, Greenstone (1997) estimates an annual loss of about 
8,000 jobs in nonattainment areas over the period 1972–1987. Importantly, his estimates assume 
that employment growth at polluting plants in less regulated areas is an appropriate control group 
from which to infer the likely change in employment in the absence of regulation. 
Pollution control is not the only source of environmental regulation. When one looks to 
the future, one sees a growing demand for land use restrictions, fueled in part by environmental 
concerns and in part by other motivations. By their very nature, land use restrictions are local or 
regional and therefore might be expected to give rise to regional economic disparities—though 
without the controversy of federally dictated policy. For example, northern Virginia (the area 
nearest Washington, D.C.) is the Silicon Valley of the East. It has experienced rapid employment 
and income growth fed by an equally rapid commercialization of once-rural countryside. Had 
severe restrictions on land use been in place 15 years ago, one can argue that the current 
economic environment might have been negatively affected. The exact effect of current 
restrictions on future growth is a topic of intense debate (Webster and Wu 1999a, 1999b; 
Alavalapati et al. 1996). In any case, it seems likely that current restrictions will have some 
regional economic cost. 
4.6. Intergenerational Issues 
Many environmental issues, such as hazardous waste disposal, habitat and species 
preservation, and global climate change, involve consequences that span generations. Although Resources for the Future  Pizer and Kopp  
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standard economic theory discounts future consequences quite rapidly, ethical arguments suggest 
a more equal treatment.41 Arrow et al. (1996) summarize these opposing views, but the issue 
remains unresolved. Recent advances in economic modeling have allowed one to model 
discounting within generations without imposing discounting across generations, providing a 
formal framework for analysis (see overlapping generations models of Howarth 1998; 
Bovenberg and Heijdra 1998). Again, the underlying question of how to compare 
intergenerational utility remains unsettled. 
The significance of this issue cannot be understated, as small differences in the discount 
rate lead to enormous differences in valuation. This feature alone has led to the observation that 
ordinary market fluctuations in interest rates could lead to the use of lower rates—even distinct 
from the intergenerational concern (Newell and Pizer 2003; Weitzman 1998). Given the 
significance of intergenerational welfare in environmental policy, we leave a more complete 
discussion of the topic to Chapter XXX of this handbook. 
5. Conclusions 
Accurate analysis of the social cost of environmental regulation requires a sophisticated 
application of welfare economics. This analysis begins with attention to nonpecuniary costs and 
unmeasured consequences at the firm and household level, continues with general equilibrium 
effects—including tax distortions, revenue recycling, and capital accumulation—and concludes 
with particular attention to the distribution of costs and consequences. Each part of this analysis 
has important lessons to offer both the practitioner and the researcher. 
Without a randomized experiment to understand the consequences of new regulation, it is 
impossible to speak confidently about the costs borne by firms. There are reasonable arguments 
suggesting that surveys and engineering studies could both under- and overestimate compliance 
costs. Case studies, econometric analyses, and retrospective analysis remain inconclusive, 
although one could interpret this to mean that such measures are, on average, unbiased. 
Economy-wide analyses identify two important effects ignored by even the most 
thorough direct cost analysis: welfare losses associated with increased tax distortions and the 
potential to offset at least some of these losses with revenue-raising environmental taxes. The 
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former concern, trumpeted by economists for more than 30 years, remains outside the scope of 
ordinary policy analysts. The latter concern, recently picked up by environmental advocates 
(Repetto and Austin 1997), remains poorly understood outside—and sometimes among—
environmental economists. 
Finally, most cost analyses ignore the differential cost of environmental regulation based 
on demographics, especially income. Costs are not borne evenly, and many regulations appear to 
be regressive. When revenue from environmental taxes is used to cut incomes taxes, especially 
on capital, the effect is acutely regressive. The same is true when marketable permits are 
provided gratis to owners of capital. An interesting question is whether, given these concerns, the 
recent trend toward market-based regulation over command-and-control approaches improves 
the well-being of all consumers. 
Despite the difficulties, one often hears the refrain that costs are easier to estimate than 
the benefits of environmental regulation, or that regulatory cost estimates are simple data 
collection and accounting exercises (as performed by the Department of Commerce and 
published in the PACE reports). This disparity of view is due, we believe, to the prevailing 
opinion among many in the policy community, and some trained economists as well, that the 
cost of environmental regulation is synonymous with the private compliance cost contained in 
self-reported surveys and engineering studies. The theory and evidence we present in this paper 
are meant to dispel that myth and to argue that, indeed, the private compliance costs may be only 
a fraction of the true social cost of regulation. Furthermore, unless one takes a very simplistic 
view of the policymaking process, the inability to measure benefits accurately does not diminish 
the importance of accurate cost measurements. 
As we look toward the future of regulatory cost analysis, several topics stand out as both 
practical concerns and important research topics. Although private costs seem to be measured 
adequately by surveys and, to a lesser extent, engineering studies, social costs consistently 
deviate from these costs because of interactions with distortionary taxes in other markets as well 
as the effects of various recycling schemes (in the case of revenue-raising policies). Further, 
most environmental policies have important equity consequences—regionally, sectorally, 
demographically, and intertemporally—that should not be ignored. The most challenging area Resources for the Future  Pizer and Kopp  
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for future work, however, will likely be improved understanding and modeling of the process of 
technological change.42 
As pollution control moves away from end-of-pipe abatement and toward pollution 
prevention and process changes, it becomes increasingly difficult to identify the operating costs 
associated with environmental protection. Even worse, as we turn to research and new 
technology to provide cleaner alternatives to polluting activities, the cost of these research and 
development activities is virtually unknown. In retrospective studies, it is difficult to know what 
improvements may have occurred elsewhere in the absence of environmentally focused R&D 
activities. In prospective studies, it is difficult to know how much improved technologies will 
cost. 
Consider the example of global climate policy and, particularly, efforts to reduce carbon 
dioxide emissions. Economists would agree that in general, effective policies to limit carbon 
dioxide emissions should raise the private of cost of carbon emitted into the atmosphere in the 
short run (through the use of tax or permit systems). The price rise will stimulate conservation of 
carbon-containing fuels and provide incentives for the development of noncarbon energy 
technologies in the future. The price increases will also have a dynamic effect on the distribution 
of resources devoted to research and development, innovation, and commercialization, with 
relatively more resources going to carbon-saving research and less elsewhere. What we do not 
know, and have only begun to conceptualize, is the effect of this altered resource distribution on 
social welfare. Will resources be diverted from medical research, nanotechnology, and 
telecommunications? And if they are, what social gains have we lost so that we can have carbon-
free energy? 
Another way to view this challenge is to consider the difficulty of evaluating different 
outcomes characterized by large changes in relative prices (e.g., carbon and other pollutants) 
over long periods of time. Existing approaches have tended to emphasize marginal changes in 
consumption and productions, with local preferences and technology estimable from recent data. 
As we consider nonmarginal changes over long periods of time, new tools for cost analysis will 
undoubtedly be needed.
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  1992 1993 1994 
Pollution Abatement and Control  104.6 110.0 121.8 
 Pollution  Abatement  100.5 105.8 117.6 
  Consumers  7.9 8.4 9.8 
  Business  65.9  69.0  76.6 
  Government  26.6  28.4  31.2 
Regulation and Monitoring; 
Research and Development 
4.2 4.2 4.2 
     
Portion of Expenditures from PACE Survey     21% 
Portion of Expenditures from Government 
Finance Survey/Census 
   22% 
Source: Vogan (1996), Tables 2 and 10. 
Table 1: Current Spending ($Billions) on Pollution Abatement and Control Resources for the Future  Pizer and Kopp  
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  Inelastic 
demand 
Elastic demand, 
no labor tax 
Elastic demand, with 
labor tax
 
“Cost” to firm  0 cx ⋅   1 cx ⋅   1 cx ⋅  
Partial equilibrium  0 cx ⋅   ( )
1
10 2 cx x ⋅+   ( )
1
10 2 cx x ⋅+  
GDP loss
a  0 cx −⋅  
= l0 – l1 
( ) 10 1 0 cx x x p −⋅ + −
 = l0 – l1 
( ) 10 1 0 cx x x p −⋅ + −  
= l0 – l1 
True welfare loss 
(general equilibrium) 
0 cx ⋅   ( )
1
10 2 cx x ⋅+   ( )( )
1
10 1 0 2 cx xt l l ⋅ ++ ⋅ −  
aNegative numbers indicate gains.  




























  Fixed demand  Downward-sloping demand 
Figure 1: Effect of Environmental Controls on Consumer Surplus, No Labor Tax 
(shaded area shows deadweight loss)Resources for the Future  Pizer and Kopp  
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Figure 2: Effect of Environmental Regulation with Preexisting Labor Tax 
(shaded area shows deadweight loss) 
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